Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind ( Explorations in Cognitive Science) [Jerry A. Fodor] on *FREE* shipping on. FODOR’S PSYCHOSEMANTICS Jerry Fodor. Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy ofMind. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press,. very long manuscript called “Psychosemantics,” and a somewhat shorter one called Reply to Jerry Fodor’s IIndividualism and Supervenience.’ ” Paper.
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Jerry A. Fodor, Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind – PhilPapers
But they are extremely sensitive to reward, easy to motivate by depriving them of food or water, and become amazing operant learners.
Actually fkdor is probably the wrong fruit, as perhaps are other details, but you get the point. And, these types of problems can overlap it seems. The rat is not, after all, a Sphex wasp, whose behavior is notoriously inflexible.
According to Millikan, you have to figure out what the most general, proximal explanation is for its selection. These are the sorts of details for this case that are important.
Indeed, it is only in virtue of such relations that they are hooked up to the environment and to behavior at all. One could be that a teleosemantic theory assigns only generic content, like fitness or nutritious. My hunch is that many readers here are sympathetic to this view, so I am being a bit brusque in my language.
My point was that none of the naturalistic accounts on offer — specifically, versions of information-theoretic and teleological semantics — suffice to pick out fine-grained, determinate content of the sort we assume mental representation requires. One jetry in which one can be subtler than TTT is is in specifying what counts as the relevant fodog.
Philosophical Review, pages —99, Myself, my main concern is with human mental representation, which I attacked via the neuroscientific route. Rarely, if ever, do the key conceptual innovations come from people on the fodo. Sometimes the neuro details are sometimes crucial, sometimes not. I doubt that rats are more like wasps than like plovers. These states may be language-like, as Fodor has argued since his famous book, Language of Thought It is only to say that they cannot offer an adequate psychosmantics of representation.
Was Psychosemantics a Failure?
Phototransducers increase fitness because they convert light into voltage fluctuations. Sure, at some level this increases fitness.
If someone swapped your perception of a rabbit for spychosemantics perception of a bunch of undetached rabbit parts, would you be able to tell? However, I have a concern about the lack of clear implications for psycho semantics of a theory of rat intentionality.
My work mentioned, in addition to arguing for 1 and 2, develops a detailed alternative.
What evolution designed here are not, in general, specific concepts, but a concept formation mechanism. I may be biased, but it strikes me that most of the recent advances have been within the domain of teleosemantics. Garfield – – Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 1: So, no one there really had any incentive to write it up as their uerry idea. Nearly all of the behavior of the rat that seems intelligent has been shaped by operant conditioning. Many thanks for that! Thanks—great posts throughout this discussion!
Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics
Everyone adds a great deal of additional apparatus; otherwise they allow in thinking thermostats and such. I recently had a conversation with three self-identified Rutgers people two Rutgers faculty plus a senior philosopher who visited Rutgers in the early s who claimed that at Rutgers it is accepted wisdom that psychosemantics was a failure.
Whereas Millikan is trying to show psychosemanticw human mental representations belong to a very broad type that goes from very simple organisms to human language. Sounds right to me Adam.
Functional overlap is very common psychoosemantics. So, premise 1 has always been something like: Suppose that, despite his unusual ignorance, this guy nevertheless knows a great deal about tiger fur and its various uses in exotic cultures.
Dan, thanks for posting the link. Eric Mandelbaum – – Inquiry: Why think they know anything about the semantics, rather than the information flow? I did not mean to suggest that PGR holds the view that I favor.
But this is how our psychosrmantics can go beyond the representational capacities of our visual systems — supposing, for the sake of argument, that teleosemantics dictates our perceptual colour representations are supposed to track fruit. How much science is necessary? This is a good place to note what seems to be a point of disagreement between us.